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Abstract 
 In the course of investigating the living world, biologists regularly attribute semantic 
content to the phenomena they study. In this paper, I examine the case of a contemporary 
research program studying the navigation behaviors of ants and develop an account of the norms 
governing researchers’ ascriptions of semantic content in their research practices. The account 
holds that researchers assign semantic content to behaviors that reliably achieve a difficult goal-
directed function, and it also suggests a productive role for attributions of semantic content in the 
process of animal behavior research. 
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1. Introduction 
 In the course of investigating the living world, biologists regularly attribute semantic 
meaning to the phenomena they study, though it remains unclear how to make sense of this 
practice (Allen and Hauser 1991; Sarkar 1996; Burghardt 2007; Griffiths and Stotz 2013; Sterner 
2014; Bechtel 2016). Geneticists have claimed DNA carries content about how to build 
organisms, physiologists say sense organs provide animals with content about their environment, 
and animal behavior researchers describe communicative actions as conveying content to others. 
Given the practice’s longstanding role in successful areas of biological research, a charitable 
assumption is that attributing meaning to living systems somehow helps biologists realize their 
epistemic goals because the practice is based on objective features of the phenomena under 
investigation. However, when philosophers set out to examine whatever notion of semantic 
content this involves, they rarely find a straightforward state of affairs.   
 Traditionally, philosophers have sought to make sense of the usage of semantic content in 
biology by determining whether biologists’ invocations of content are justified. A popular 
approach to justifying the notion of content is to produce a comprehensive, metaphysical account 
of content that grounds content in objective natural properties. This ontology-centered approach 
to making sense of semantic content often abstracts away from scientific practice in favor of 
reconstructed scientific explanations. Instead of analyzing the way biologists identify content in 
practice and the research activities caused by their identifications of content, ontology-focused 
philosophers look to the theoretical knowledge encapsulated in scientific explanations to guide 
and constrain their metaphysical accounts of content.  
 As a result, a gap has emerged between the metaphysical accounts of content that 
ontology-focused philosophers produce to make sense of content in principle and the way 
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biologists utilize the notion of content in practice. This gap is especially apparent in the 
neurobehavioral sciences. Ontological, teleosemantic theorists like Millikan (1990) and Neander 
(2017) maintain that content supervenes on properties constituting etiological selected effects 
functions, in part because such etiological functions allow a crucial distinction between 
representing and misrepresenting in a way that alternative theories of function, such as cybernetic 
goal-directed function, do not. However, as multiple philosophers have noted (Bigelow & 
Pargetter 1987; Kitcher 1993; Godfrey-Smith 1993, 200; Amundson and Lauder 1994; Walsh 
1996, 558; Boorse 2002, 73; Wouters 2003, 656), physiologists investigating how mechanisms 
within organisms causally contribute to interesting capacities seem to ascribe functions to traits 
without any detailed knowledge of those traits’ etiologies. Much work in the neurobehavioral 
sciences falls into this gap since some notion of biological function seems to figure prominently 
into neurobehavioral researchers’ ascriptions of content, yet researchers’ do not seem to justify 
their ascriptions of content in the ways that etiological, ontology-focused accounts of content 
suggest.1 
 If neurobehavioral researchers investigating the physiological basis of behavior do not 
ascribe content according to the criteria articulated by philosophers’ ontological accounts, then 
what criteria do they follow? And are these practical criteria justified by the role ascriptions of 
content play in helping neurobehavioral researchers achieve their epistemic aims?  
																																																						
1 Within the functions debate, some philosophers have argued the stronger claim that biological 
usage warrants a totally ahistorical theory of function, not just a non-etiological theory of 
function (Amundson and Lauder 1994; Walsh 1996, 558; Boorse 2002, 73). However, Garson 
(2019) has recently argued that there are no ahistorical theories of biological function on the 
grounds that purportedly ahistorical theories actually retain a historical dimension. Garson’s 
point that theories of function can reference history in nonobvious ways is well taken, and this 
paper addresses the question of how history figures into researchers’ ascriptions of content in 
section 4. 	
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 This paper answers those questions within the context of neuroethological research into 
animal navigation by examining a new case study where researchers assign semantic content to 
the neurophysiological processes enabling ant navigation. In the late 1960s, Rüdiger Wehner 
began a research program focused on the navigation behaviors of desert ants in the genus 
Cataglyphis. Wehner’s research program continues into the 21st century, and its success has 
transformed Cataglyphis into a model organism for animal navigation studies.  
 By analyzing the experiments that Wehner and colleagues use to test their hypothetical 
ascriptions of content, I produce an account that clarifies the evidential norms governing their 
ascriptions of content. The account holds that researchers assign semantic content to 
neurophysiological mechanisms that 1) possess a goal-directed function and 2) reliably achieve 
this function despite the difficulty of the goal. The result is not a full-blown, comprehensive 
theory of content. Researchers’ practices and pronouncements do not specify solutions to all the 
metaphysical problems that have traditionally interested philosophers (e.g. the content 
localization and content determinacy problems). Rather, the result of my analysis is a local 
account of content attribution that has the virtue of clarifying how researchers’ ascriptions of 
content figure into the diachronic progression of their research program to help them achieve 
their epistemic aims. Thus, this paper demonstrates how attributions of content can aid 
researchers in achieving their epistemic goals even when researchers’ standards for ascribing 
content remain indeterminate in relation to a full theory of content.  
 Before situating this practice-based approach within the literature and showing how the 
results of this approach are of philosophical interest to existing projects, I need to explain a 
terminological point. I have chosen to use “semantic content” or “content” throughout this paper, 
terms from the biological information literature, because the researchers I analyze often frame 
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their attributions of meaning in terms of information processing and storage. However, “semantic 
content” is sometimes thought to imply theoretical claims about levels of intentionality or the 
symbol-mediated nature of semantic processes. In referring to researchers’ attributions of 
meaning as attributions of semantic content, I am not picking out a theoretical subtype of 
meaning attribution nor assuming that all of researchers’ attributions of meaning presuppose 
claims about intentionality or symbols. The phenomenon of interest is researchers’ practice of 
identifying some minimal notion of content within biological phenomena. 
 
2. The Value of Clarifying How Successful Researchers Identify Content in Practice 
 This paper is primarily concerned with illuminating the epistemological value of content 
ascriptions in animal navigation research. Historically, behavioral scientists have doubted 
whether ascribing content carrying states to animals has any epistemic value (Watson 1913; 
Skinner 1977). Currently, even researchers skeptical of content ascriptions accept the minimal 
claim that content ascriptions have the potential to aid behavioral research under some 
circumstances (Wynne 2004). However, the problem of when and how ascriptions of content are 
useful to researchers remains an open question (Gould and Gould 1982; Dennett 1988; Allen and 
Hauser 1991; Newen and Bartels 2007; Cameron 2013). This paper advances the discussion by 
articulating how exactly ascriptions of content actually aid neuroethologists’ efforts to provide 
causal physiological understandings of animal navigation. 
 When investigating the role of content ascriptions in behavioral research, one must 
distinguish between the role such ascriptions play in explanation versus in producing evidence 
since it is not obvious that scientists’ content ascriptions play the same role in both contexts. 
Ontological accounts of content are usually built to capture the theoretical role of content 
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ascription in explanation. For example, in building an ontological account of content, Shea 
(2018; p. 230) sets himself the task of showing “why representational properties underpin better 
explanations of behaviour than would otherwise be available.” In contrast, this paper sets itself 
the task of clarifying whether and how neuroethologists’ ascriptions of content figure into the 
process of successful navigation research. 
 Bechtel (2016) engaged in a project similar to the one pursued here when he analyzed 
ascriptions of content within a neurobehavioral research program investigating mammalian 
navigation. After analyzing how the notion of neural representation figures into the progression 
of that research program, Bechtel argues that researchers are committed to the ontological reality 
of semantic content. Furthermore, Bechtel (2016, p. 1291) makes the epistemological argument 
that ascriptions of content are a necessary component of the research process because they allow 
researchers to formulate hypotheses that guide research. In particular, Bechtel argues that 
ascriptions of content help researchers employ the mechanistic research strategies of localization 
and decomposition described by Bechtel and Richardson (1992/2010). 
 This paper builds on the results of Bechtel (2016) with a novel case study that provides a 
more detailed analysis of the experimental practices and habits of reasoning that researchers use 
to justify their ascriptions of content, illuminating how exactly ascriptions of content figure into 
the mechanistic research strategies of localization and decomposition. Briefly put, there is a 
reciprocal relationship between researcher’s specifications of content-carrying vehicles and the 
content carried by those vehicles. Experiments that produce evidence about the nature of content-
carrying vehicles help researchers formulate tractable hypotheses about the nature of the content 
carried by those vehicles, and vice versa.  
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 Finally, although this paper is primarily concerned with illuminating the epistemological 
value of content ascriptions, the account of content ascription provided here also has value for a 
bottom-up style of ontological theorizing about semantic content and cognition.  
 Bergstrom and Rosvall (2011a; 2011b) modeled this approach when they built a 
transmission account of biological information that does not reference semantic content. The 
account draws on scientific practice, and Bergstrom and Rosvall argue that it justifies biologists’ 
ascriptions of information independently of semantic justifications. In response to critiques that 
their account does not address the semantic dimension of information that has traditionally 
interested philosophers (Shea 2011; Maclaurin 2011), Bergstrom and Rosvall (2011b) make the 
crucial point that the objective criteria they provide for diagnosing biological information have 
implications for the semantic dimension of information even though they do not directly 
reference the semantic dimension of information.  
 This approach to ontological theorizing is in keeping with more recent calls from 
philosophers to engage with the concepts of content and cognition at a level of analysis that is 
relevant to the concerns of practicing biologists. For instance, Sterner (2014) developed 
Bergstrom and Rosvall’s approach into a broader methodology for naturalizing semantic content. 
Just as biologists do not require a complete, naturalized account of semantic content to 
productively investigate biological phenomena as being potentially semantic, Sterner (2014) 
argues that philosophers do not need to produce a complete account of biological information for 
the account to be philosophically interesting. Instead, philosophers can begin with a provisional 
set of criteria for identifying cases of biological information. Those cases then provide a neutral 
starting point for developing and distinguishing different naturalized views of content in a 
comparative manner. Allen (2017, p. 4240) outlines a similar approach to defining cognition, 
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arguing for a “relaxed pluralism” that is motivated by “a commitment to letting the productivity 
of research programs in cognitive science guide the extension of [cognitive] language to new 
contexts.” Contrast these approaches with that of Thompson and Piccinini (2018), who assume 
an account of content and then argue that the existence of neural representations is an empirical 
fact by demonstrating how the work of neurobehavioral researchers satisfies the criteria of that 
account.  
 Rather than assuming that philosophers are in a position to build comprehensive 
ontological accounts of content or cognition, bottom-up approaches begin with provisional 
notions of content or cognition that are informed by ongoing empirical research. The account of 
content ascription offered here figures into this bottom-up style of ontological theorizing by 
providing a provisional set of criteria that philosophers can use to identify semantic content in 
animal navigation research. Although I do not discuss the relationship in this paper, the criteria I 
enumerate in section 5 have clear affinities with Bergstrom and Rosvall’s appeal to Shannon 
information, and I similarly draw on the idea that information theory provides a means of 
diagnosing phenomena in need of an explanation. 
 
3. Navigation Behavior in the Desert Ant Cataglyphis   
 Neuroethologist Rüdiger Wehner and his colleagues have consistently made hypothetical 
ascriptions of content and then performed behavioral experiments that produced decisive 
evidence supporting those ascriptions. The research program has employed a variety of 
experimental strategies to this end. In this section, I elucidate the aims and practices 
characterizing a particularly prevalent experimental strategy. Then, I outline a series of 
experiments conducted according to that strategy that caused Wehner and colleagues to endorse 
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a novel attribution of semantic content. All this provides a backdrop that allows the role of 
semantic content ascriptions to be examined in the context of a particular community of 
researchers successfully pursuing common research goals via a common research strategy.  
 In the deserts of Northern Africa and Israel, ants of the genus Cataglyphis forage for food 
during the hottest part of the day. Often, their prey takes the form of other insects who have 
succumbed to heat death. Relative to their size, the foraging ants can travel vast distances from 
their subterranean nest in search of food, and because the ants are solitary foragers, they do not 
use the pheromone trails of nest mates to navigate as many other species of ant do (Wehner and 
Srinivasan 1981, 316; Ronacher 2008; Steck et al. 2009; Wehner and Rössler 2013). Despite 
their circuitous searches for food, Cataglyphis foragers consistently return home from foraging 
runs via the most direct route.  
 All these traits attracted the attention of Rüdiger Wehner in the late 1960s. In the roughly 
five decades since, Wehner has spent his career building a research program around Cataglyphis’ 
sensory capacities, neurophysiology, and navigation behaviors. That research program has 
transformed Cataglyphis from a largely unknown genus of ant to a model organism in navigation 
studies. (For Cataglyphis as model organism, see Lenoir et al. 2009; Steck et al. 2009; Wehner 
and Rössler 2013, 514; For a review of Cataglyphis navigation research prior to Wehner’s 
career, see Wehner 2016). From both a sociological and traditional epistemic view of science, 
Wehner’s research program has been a success: the research is highly regarded by the scientific 
community and has furthered scientists’ understanding of how insects’ neurosensory physiology 
enables them to navigate their environments.  
 Throughout the history of this program, researchers have utilized a behavioral research 
strategy to determine whether hypothesized ascriptions of content are justified. Though details of 
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the research strategy vary according to its particular application, there are general defining 
features. Fundamentally, the strategy exploits the fact that Cataglyphis are central place foragers 
and enables researchers to use Cataglyphis’ navigation behavior to make inferences about 
neurophysiological phenomena they cannot directly observe in situ. Researchers begin by 
training the animal to navigate to particular location, often using food. Having reached the 
trained location, the animal then attempts to return to the nest. Together, the outbound and 
inbound run present researchers with the opportunity to observe navigation behavior whose 
outcomes can be safely assumed. Researchers are then able to manipulate features of the 
animal’s body or environment bearing on the animal’s sensory capacities to make inferences 
about how those sensory capacities causally contribute to navigation behavior. Those inferences 
sometimes lead researchers to assign semantic content to states or processes within the animal.  
 For instance, Wehner and colleagues have used the above research strategy to investigate 
path integration in Cataglyphis, and those investigations have led researchers to assign semantic 
content to Cataglyphis neurophysiological processes. Path integration, or dead-reckoning, is a 
navigational strategy that allows navigators to determine their location relative to a point of 
origin. To perform path integration, a navigator must record the distance and direction of each 
segment of their outgoing journey relative to a point of origin. Formally, modelers represent the 
outgoing journey as a series of vectors where the paired values of each vector represent the 
distance and direction of each segment of the outgoing journey. Recording distance and direction 
of travel are prerequisites for path integration, which is performed when a navigator integrates all 
the vectors representing their outgoing journey into a single vector. That single vector then 
represents the most direct route back to the point of origin (in the case of Cataglyphis navigators 
and other central place foragers, the point of origin is the nest). By constantly recording distance 
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and direction of travel and then constantly integrating those values, a navigator maintains 
constant access to how far away and in what direction their point of origin is.  
 Early on, Wehner hypothesized that Cataglyphis foragers used path integration to reliably 
return home via the most direct route after their circuitous searches for food (Wehner 2013, 5).  
For an early example of the research program’s use of content-laden terms to describe path 
integration in Cataglyphis, consider this quote featuring both informatic and intentional terms 
from Wehner and Srinivasan (1981, 316):  
 “In relying on such a dead-reckoning system it [the foraging ant] must keep track of all of 
its motions during foraging, and using this information it must continually compute the mean 
vector pointing from its actual position towards home […] No vector integration system would 
allow the ant to be absolutely sure about the position of the nest.”  
 For a more recent example, consider Wehner and Rössler (2013):  
 “A desert ant (Cataglyphis fortis) is endowed with a 0.1-mg brain and has an outdoor life 
expectancy of approximately 6 days. Nevertheless, it is able to acquire, store, retrieve, handle, 
and use amazing amounts of spatial information.”  
 The above quotes provide vague specifications of where content vehicles are located and 
what the contents of those vehicles are. In the first quote, researchers speak of content that is 
about “motions during foraging” and content that is about “the position of the nest”, while the 
second quote speaks generally of “spatial information.” Regarding the location of content, the 
second quote implies that the content is generally localized to processes within the ant’s nervous 
system. For philosophers interested in building a comprehensive theory of content, these 
ascriptions may seem too vague to be of import. However, as researchers investigate the 
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neurophysiological processes that produce Cataglyphis’ impressive navigation behavior, their 
ascriptions of content become more specific.  
 For example, in 2006 and 2007, Wehner, his colleague Harald Wolf, and their joint 
doctoral student Matthias Wittlinger performed a series of experiments to test the more specific 
hypothesis that Cataglyphis foragers record information about distance traveled via some kind of 
step-counting mechanism (Wittlinger et al. 2006, 2007). The idea that ants could use walking 
behavior as a proxy for distance travelled stems from the idea that ants walk in such a consistent 
way that some regular unit of walking, like a step, corresponds to some regular unit of distance. 
Thus, if the ants recorded how many steps they took on each segment of an outgoing journey, 
they could record the distance they had walked on each segment of their outgoing journey, which 
is exactly the input successful path integration requires.  
 In the experiment, Wittlinger et. al (2006) began by training ants to walk on a linear 
metal channel from their nest to a feeder. Once ants were trained to forage at a specific feeder 
site using the route provided by the metal channel, researchers captured foraging ants at the 
feeder site, manipulated the length of the ants’ legs, and released the ants into a second metal 
channel running parallel to the original channel each ant had traversed on her outbound journey. 
The difference between the two channels was that the first channel led from the ants’ nest to the 
feeder site while the second parallel channel began near the feeder site but continued on past the 
ants’ nest. To manipulate the length of ants’ legs, researchers either shortened them by snipping 
the legs down to stumps or elongated them by supergluing stilts made of pig bristles to the end of 
each leg. Once the trained ants had reached the feeder site and were ready to return to their nest 
with food, researchers captured the ants, manipulated their legs, released them into the second 
channel, and observed the nest-bound navigation behavior of the manipulated ants.  
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 Researchers manipulated the length of the ants’ legs to manipulate the distance ants cover 
per step. The longer an ants’ legs, the more distance that ant travels per step; the shorter the legs, 
the less distance an ant covers. If the ants indeed relied upon a correspondence between some 
unit of locomotion and some unit of distance traveled, researchers’ manipulations would have 
broken that correspondence, causing ants with stumps to cover less distance on their incoming 
journey than they had on their outgoing journey and causing ants with stilts to cover more 
distance on their incoming journey than they had on their outgoing journey. If the hypothesis that 
step-counting mechanism produces semantic content about distance travelled were true, then ants 
with stilts should systematically overshoot the nest on their return journey while ants with 
stumps should systematically undershoot the nest on their return journey. 
 Researchers could not directly observe when an ant’s path integrator indicated that the 
ant has navigated back to her nest. Instead, researchers used the ants’ looping search pattern 
behavior as a means of inferring when the ant’s path integrator indicated that the ant had reached 
her nest (Wehner and Srinivasan 1981; Wittlinger et al. 2007). By observing where ants began 
looping search behavior and scrutinizing the distances covered in that looping search, researchers 
made inferences about where ants “expected” their nest to be.  
 Upon performing the stilts and stumps experiment, researchers found that ants with stilts 
did systematically overshoot the location of the nest while ants with stumps systematically 
undershot the location of the nest. Furthermore, researchers repeated the experiment but allowed 
the ants to go on both outgoing and incoming journeys with manipulated legs so that the ants left 
their nest for the feeder walking on stilts or stumps, were relocated by researchers to the parallel 
channel, and then attempted to navigate home to their nest. In this variation of the experiment, 
the ants successfully navigated to the location their nest should have been. That result further 
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supported researcher’s hypothesis because it indicated that the ants could successfully perform 
path integration with legs of different lengths so long as the distance covered by each step was 
consistent from the outgoing journey to the incoming journey. Based on those series of stilts and 
stumps experiments, researchers concluded that the ants received semantic content about units of 
locomotion characterizing a journey from some kind of step-counter. In Wittlinger et al.’s (2006, 
1967) words, “Future studies will have to address the mechanism of the proposed step integrator, 
for example, whether it actually registers steps by means of proprioceptors, or whether it 
integrates activity of a walking pattern generator, and to what extent sensory feedback regarding 
stride length and walking performance is considered.” 
 In the next section, I examine the practices and habits of reasoning that allow 
experiments like the stilts and stumps experiment to generate evidence supporting novel, 
increasingly specific ascriptions of content. As it turns out, biological functions play a central 
role in those habits of reasoning. Then, in section 5, I introduce two more conceptual distinctions 
that bear on researchers’ ascriptions of content: the difficulty and reliability of a function. The 
major argument is that researchers attribute content to processes that reliably accomplish difficult 
goal-directed functions.  
 
4. The Stilts and Stumps Experiment Justifies a Goal-Directed Notion of Function 
 A central tenet of teleosemantic theories is that representational properties supervene on 
functional properties. The stilts and stumps experiment shows how the epistemological 
endeavors of navigation researchers comport with that ontological claim. To determine whether a 
neurophysiological process is content-bearing, Wittlinger et al. investigate the functional 
properties of neurophysiological processes via behavioral experiments. In this section, I argue 
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that those experiments are governed by evidential norms that are best captured by a goal-directed 
notion of function rather than the etiological, selected-effects notion of function traditionally 
championed by teleosemantic theorists.  
 To see the deep connection between function and content in the Cataglyphis research 
program generally and the stilts and stumps experiment in particular, consider where the stilts 
and stumps experiment fits into the dialectic between hypotheses and experiments driving that 
research program. In the beginning, researchers observe that ants possess the behavioral capacity 
to reliably return home via the most direct route. That observation causes them to infer that the 
ants possess internal mechanisms that are causally responsible for realizing that capacity. Next, 
the content-ascribing hypothesis that ants perform path integration is formulated in functional 
terms: ants are able to navigate home via the most direct route by integrating content about 
distance and direction of travel. The path integration hypothesis specifies content but not content 
vehicles; it remains an open question what neurophysiological processes serve as vehicles for 
content about distance and direction of travel. The stilts and stumps experiment is designed to 
address part of that question by determining whether the vehicles that carry content about 
distance traveled are located in a step-counting mechanism. To support the step-counter 
hypothesis, researchers need to demonstrate that some neurophysiological process records 
content about some locomotion parameter corresponding to distance travelled. By examining the 
things researchers do to determine whether or not the physiological process in question actually 
exists and possesses the function of recording content, it will become clear that researchers 
justify their ascriptions of content according to a goal-directed notion of function.  
 Before demonstrating how the stilts and stumps experiment produces evidence for a goal-
directed notion of function, it is worth re-examining the nature of goal-directed functions. A 
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common trait shared by accounts of goal-directed function is that they use modal language to 
define directedness (Braithwaite 1953; Sommerhoff 1969; Boorse 1976). Generally, such 
accounts hold that a system exhibits goal-directed function if the system’s behavior is flexible or 
plastic enough to realize the goal within a stipulated set of circumstances. To determine whether 
a dynamic system has a function on such an account, one needs to know about the outcomes of 
modal variations of the system’s behavior. When the modal variations of behavior all realize 
their goal within the possible worlds stipulated by the account, then one can rightfully assign 
goal-directed function to that behavior.  
 The fundamental point of correspondence between the stilts and stumps research strategy 
and goal-directed accounts of function is the shared emphasis on assessing behavioral outcomes 
according to a predefined goal and comparing behavioral outcomes of the same type. Goal-
directed accounts ground function in a trait’s ability to achieve a privileged outcome across a 
range of heterogeneous circumstances. Similarly, the stilts and stumps experiment supports the 
hypothesis that a trait possesses a content-carrying function by comparing the outcomes of that 
trait across a range of heterogeneous circumstances to a privileged outcome.  
 
4.1 Developing A Notion of Goal-Directed Function that Captures the Notion of 
Function Justified by the Stilts and Stumps Experiment 
 To develop a goal-directed notion of function that captures the notion of function 
supported by the stilts and stumps experiment, I modify Boorse’s (1976) modal account of goal-
directed function. I use this account as a starting point because it provides such a minimal, 
unadorned articulation of goal-directed dynamics. Boorse (1976, 78) puts forward his definition 
in a single sentence: “To say that an action or process A is directed to the goal G is to say not 
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only that A is what is required for G, but also that within some range of environmental variation, 
A would have been modified in whatever way was required for G.” To convert Boorse’s account 
of function into something that captures the epistemic activities of Wittlinger et al., the account 
needs to be modified. 
 First, to determine whether some system possesses some function, Boorse’s account 
requires one to know the outcomes of modal variations of that system’s behavior. Lacking 
empirical access to alternate possible worlds, biologists cannot compare modal variations of the 
same behavioral instance. However, in the stilts and stumps experiment, Wittlinger et al. 
approximate that activity. First, Wittlinger et al. acquired a homogenous group of animals. That 
meant finding and training a group of ants that had matured to the developmental stage at which 
ants leave the nest to forage outdoors. By training those ants in an identical manner, researchers 
condition the ants to perform behaviors of the same type under controlled circumstances. That 
arrangement allows researchers to observe the outcomes of the same behavioral type under a 
variety of controlled circumstances. Instead of observing modal variants of the same behavior, 
researchers approximate that activity by observing various instantiations of the same behavioral 
type.  
 Second, Boorse’s (1976, 78) account of function holds that for a behavior to have a 
function, the behavior must be both “required for” the realization of the goal and plastic in the 
sense that the behavior would have been modified “in whatever way was required” to achieve its 
goal, within some range of environmental variation. Both of these strong requirements need to be 
weakened. Wehner’s Cataglyphis program recognizes that foragers possess redundant means of 
achieving the same navigational goals (Wehner 2020, Chapter 7), and they ascribe content-
bearing functions to traits that are sufficient but not necessary for achieving such goals. 
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Concerning the latter half of Boorse’s account, even within a given set circumstances, the 
requirement that animals always modify behavior to successfully achieve a privileged goal 
outcome is too strong. It is difficult to account for the wide range of variables that potentially 
affect an animal’s behavior, even in meticulously controlled settings. Discrepancies in behavior 
may come down to apparently similar animals having different developmental life histories, 
animals receiving different treatment from researchers, or other experimental contingencies. 
Whatever the cause of behavioral discrepancy, researchers generally accept the results of non-
unanimous experiments. That is, it does not need to be the case that every animal modifies their 
behavior in whatever way was necessary to achieve some goal for researchers to assign goal-
directed function to that behavior type. Given the complexities of using animals as objects of 
research, scientists tolerate non-unanimous data. 
 Third, Boorse (1976, 78 emphasis added) writes that “[…] within some range of 
environmental variation, A would have been modified in whatever way was required for G.” 
However, in the stilts and stumps experiment, Wittlinger et al. varied both the environment 
foragers navigated and the physiology of the foragers themselves. Instead of testing directedness 
solely by observing behavioral outcomes in different environments, Wittlinger et al. also test 
directedness by observing the behavioral outcomes of altered animals. Instead of speaking of 
environmental variations, it would be more appropriate to speak of circumstantial variations. 
 The final and most substantial modification has to do with specifying goals, a crucial 
aspect of the goal-directed notion of function. Within an epistemic context, evidence supporting 
an ascription of goal-directed function is produced by comparing outcomes to a pre-defined, 
privileged goal outcome. Without specifying that outcome, evidence for goal-directed function 
cannot be produced. However, Boorse’s (1976) account doesn’t tightly specify what counts as a 
	 19 
goal. To adapt Boorse’s account to the epistemic activities of Wehner’s Cataglyphis research 
program, one must recognize that in practice, researchers specify goals according to some 
etiological selected effects notion of function.   
 Evidence for this comes from the way scientists involved in Wehner’s Cataglyphis 
research program talk. Describing his methodology, Wehner (2013, 8) has written that “[I]t is 
only by considering a given navigational tool in the wider context of the animal’s behavioral 
ecology that the proper questions can be asked—the ones that Cataglyphis itself, rather than the 
human investigator, had to answer during its evolutionary history” (See also Wehner 1987, 511). 
Furthermore, researchers introduce their research reports on path integration in ways that imply 
that path integration is a long-established species-level capacity that has provided ants with 
adaptive benefits relative to their environment (Wehner and Srinivasan 1981; Ronacher 2008; 
Wehner and Rössler 2013).  
 To be clear, I am not arguing that Wehner’s research program investigates the adaptive 
significance of past instances of traits to specify privileged goal outcomes for their experiments. 
To specify what outcomes count as the hypothesized goal of some behavioral or 
neurophysiological trait, Wehner’s research program makes assumptions concerning the adaptive 
significance of past instances of that trait. My appeal to selected-effects function here is 
analogous to the way Kitcher (2016) appeals to selected-effects function to modify Cummins’ 
causal role function. Kitcher argues that the explanatory role of function ascriptions in 
physiology can be captured by restricting Cummins functions so that instead of a part’s function 
being its contribution to some capacity of interest to an observer, a part’s function is its 
contribution to some capacity that has been shaped by unspecified evolutionary selection 
processes. Kitcher and I develop hybrid notions of function for different purposes, but we agree 
	 20 
that evolutionary considerations play a background role in specifying the privileged outcomes 
investigated by physiologists.2  
 
4.2 Why the Notion of Goal-Directed Function Developed Above Best Captures the 
Notion of Function Justified by the Stilts and Stumps Experiment  
 Having proposed a modified account of goal-directed function, I now turn to 
demonstrating how this account captures the evidential norms governing ascriptions of content in 
the stilts and stumps experiment. Researchers begin with a hypothetical ascription of a content-
bearing function: ants possess a step-counter whose function is to record content about a 
locomotion related parameter that maintains a reliable correspondence with distance traveled. 
The connection between the way researchers justify such hypothetical ascriptions of a content-
bearing function and goal-directed function has to do with the act of comparing behavioral 
outcomes. On goal-directed accounts, to determine whether a system possesses a function, one 
must know the outcomes of that system’s behavior across a variety of possible worlds; In the 
stilts and stumps experiment, to determine whether ants possess a content-bearing function, 
researchers must observe the outcomes of ants’ navigation behavior across a variety of 
experimentally controlled circumstances.  
																																																						
2 Neander (2016) concedes that Kitcher’s hybrid account of function has the potential to ground 
the crucial function/malfunction distinction in objective phenomena, but she critiques Kitcher’s 
account for leaving important questions unanswered. Namely, how are adaptive capacities 
assigned to trait types? Within what environmental contexts must a trait type be adaptive? And 
how are those trait types individuated? A major point of this paper is that researchers do not 
require comprehensive answers to such questions for their ascriptions of content-bearing 
functions to play a productive role in the development of a successful research program. Still, as 
the next section demonstrates, the evidential norms governing researcher’s ascriptions of 
content-bearing functions suggest partial answers to such questions.	
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 In both cases, the act of comparing behavioral outcomes to privileged goal outcomes 
plays a central justificatory role. Consider a traditional example of goal-directed function: the 
heat-seeking missile. On a goal-directed account, the missile possesses the function of homing 
toward high temperatures by virtue of the fact that across a range of circumstances, the missile 
would alter its course to home toward high temperatures. In this example, counterfactual 
outcomes (what the missile in question would do) are compared to a privileged goal outcome 
(what a heat-seeking missile does) to determine whether the missile possesses heat-seeking 
function. If the two sorts of outcomes are sufficiently similar, the missile in question possesses 
the function. The stilts and stumps experiment progressed in a similar manner. Researchers 
predict where ants would navigate if their hypothesis is true. Then, they observe where 
experimental ants actually navigate. If the two are sufficiently similar (e.g. ants’ whose legs were 
shortened to stumps before returning home from a foraging journey undershot the nest by 3.86 
meters), then researchers have evidence supporting their hypothetical ascription of a content-
bearing function.  
 At this point, an apparent problem arises concerning researchers’ specifications of 
privileged goal outcomes. If researchers specify goals according to background evolutionary 
considerations, as I argued earlier, then how can undershooting the nest by 4 meters be an 
example of a privileged goal outcome? Overshooting or undershooting the nest seem like 
maladaptive behavioral outcomes for homing ants. The solution is to remember that the stilts and 
stumps experiment is focused on the step-counter mechanism, not homing behavior in general. 
Usually, when all the component mechanisms controlling homing behavior in an ant function 
properly, the ant performs successful homing behavior and navigates back to her nest. One of the 
reasons the stilts and stumps experiment is so remarkable is that it severs the connection that 
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usually obtains between the proper functioning of neurophysiological mechanisms and 
successful behavioral outcomes. Wittlinger et al. designed situations where ants would not 
successfully navigate to their nests if a hypothesized component mechanism was functioning 
properly. The privileged goal outcomes specified in the stilts and stumps experiment (i.e. 
undershooting or overshooting the nest) only seem problematic when viewed as privileged goal 
outcomes for navigation behavior, not when viewed as privileged goal outcomes for step-
counting.  
 No other account of function captures the notion of function justified by the stilts and 
stumps experiment as well as this modified account of goal-directed function developed in this 
section. Consider two alternate accounts of biological function: propensity functions and 
selected-effects functions. One might object that a modified version of Bigelow and Pargetter’s 
(1987) propensity account of function would work just as well for capturing the notion of 
function supported by the stilts and stumps experiment. After all, the stilts and stumps 
experiment seems to produce evidence that satisfies the criteria of the propensity account by 
supporting the claim that the hypothesized step-counter confers “a survival- enhancing 
propensity” to foraging ants (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, 192). Similarly, given a few 
background assumptions and inferences, one could interpret the results of the stilts and stumps 
experiment as satisfying the criteria of a selected-effects account of function. That is, the 
experiment could be interpreted as supporting claims about the history of selection that caused 
the step-counting trait to exist in contemporary ants. However, such objections miss what makes 
goal-directed function so well suited to the research strategy in question.  
 It is not merely that researchers’ experiments produce evidence bearing on the criteria of 
goal-directed function. Goal-directed function best captures the notion of function supported by 
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the stilts and stumps experiment because the experiment consists of actions that closely 
correspond to the function-making criteria enumerated in goal-directed accounts of function. In 
other words, goal-directed accounts outline a procedure for determining whether something has a 
function, and that procedure closely matches the procedure used by Wittlinger et al. to determine 
whether ants possess the content-bearing function of step-counting. 
 Alternatively, selected-effects accounts of function do suggest procedures for identifying 
function, but those procedures do not match the stilts and stumps experiment as well as goal-
directed function. Consider Millikan’s (1989, 199) tight articulation of selected-effects function, 
“A trait’s function is what it actually did—did most recently—that accounts for its current 
presence in the population, as over against historical alternative traits no longer present.” To 
determine whether a trait has a function on such an account, one must know things about 
ancestral traits. However, Wittlinger et al. do not investigate ancestral traits in the stilts and 
stumps experiment, and as I argued in section 4, traits’ history of selection does not play a 
primary role in the evidential norms governing researchers’ ascriptions of content-bearing 
functions. Additionally, some accounts of selected-effects function, like Millikan’s above, 
feature a comparative element. To specify a trait’s function, one must compare what an ancestral 
homologue of a trait did to what historical alternatives did and focus on the difference between 
the two. This is a totally different style of comparison than the comparative procedure outlined 
by goal-directed accounts of function and practiced by Wittlinger et al. in the stilts and stumps 
experiment. With selected-effects accounts of function, the difference between the effects of 
alternative traits helps specify function; in the stilts and stumps experiment, the similarity of 
behavioral outcomes supports the ascription of a pre-specified function. 
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5. Researchers Ascribe Content to Neurophysiological Processes that Reliably Achieve 
a Difficult Goal-Directed Function  
 A context where animal behavior researchers tend to invoke content is when describing 
how animals coordinate their behaviors with their environment in sophisticated ways, and 
Wehner’s work on Cataglyphis navigation is an instance of that trend. The ant’s ability to return 
home via the most direct route is impressive in the sense that one would not expect it to happen 
by accident. The ant must have some means of coordinating herself with the environment that 
explains how she reliably achieves her extraordinary navigational feats. In what follows, I 
articulate the norms governing this distinction between difficult goal-directed functions and 
easier, more mundane functions. Then, I argue that those norms play a role in dictating 
appropriate ascriptions of content. Wehner’s Cataglyphis research program only ascribes content 
to neurophysiological processes that reliably achieve a difficult goal-directed function.  
 
5.1 Difficult Goals and Behavioral Repertoires 
 Why do researchers treat the function of returning home via the most direct route as 
difficult in a way that a more mundane function, like gaining traction on the ground while 
walking, is not? In the most general terms, it comes down to (a) the number of ways an ant could 
attempt to achieve a goal that would causally contribute to it versus (b) the number of ways an 
ant could attempt to achieve a goal that would not causally contribute to it. The larger (a) is 
relative to (b), the easier the goal-directed function; the larger (b) is relative to (a), the more 
difficult the goal-directed function.  
 This articulation of difficulty relies upon the ethological notion of a behavioral repertoire, 
or a finite set of potential behaviors. Ethologists generally treat categories of animals as 
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possessing behavioral repertoires (Lorenz 1950; Tinbergen 1963; Hinde 1982, 43). Those animal 
categories can be quite general, like the taxonomic category of species, or they can be narrower, 
like a particular developmental stage of a certain sex in a species.  
 In addition to relying upon ethologists’ practice of treating animals as possessing finite 
behavioral repertoires, the notion of difficulty articulated above also relies upon ethologists’ 
practice of categorizing animal dynamics according to types. In the course of their investigations, 
ethological researchers in general and Wehner’s Cataglyphis research program in particular 
exhibit the ability to reach consensus about what instances of animal dynamics belong to what 
behavioral or neurophysiological types (Allen and Bekoff 1997, 47; Hinde 1982, 30–32; Lehner 
1996, 110–14; Love 2009, 61–62). For example, an ethologist may divide behaviors into 
ontogenetic types so that behaviors are categorized according to the developmental stage at 
which an organism exhibits those behaviors. Alternatively, ethologists also categorize 
neurophysiological dynamics into functional types, as I argued Wittlinger et al. did in the stilts 
and stumps experiment with “step-counting.” Researchers interpret animal dynamics as 
belonging to types, and though researchers studying ant behavior tend to reach consensus about 
what actions count as instances of what types, researchers lack an explicit, comprehensive 
account of how they make those interpretations and reach consensus (Gordon 1992). In 
analyzing ethologists’ research practices, I will therefore assume the availability of an 
appropriate typology of behaviors but leave a full analysis of its basis for another context. 
 To see how the notion of difficulty articulated above distinguishes between goal-directed 
functions, consider ant locomotion behavior. To move around, ants’ tarsomeres need to gain 
traction with the ground so the ants can generate thrust in a particular direction. Gaining traction 
is a component goal necessary for achieving the higher-level goal of walking. Ants possess a 
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behavioral repertoire, and researchers interpret some subset of that repertoire as stepping-type 
behavior that possesses the function of gaining traction on the ground. The exact size of that 
subset is unclear. As stated in Lehner’s (1996, 109) Handbook of Ethological Methods, “The 
choice of an appropriate behavior unit is generally based on experience, tradition, logistics, and 
intuition.” Surely, the choice of an appropriate behavior unit is also influenced by the questions 
under investigation. It may be the case that researchers treat stepping behavior as highly 
stereotyped so that there are a small number of actions that count as step-taking. Alternatively, 
researchers may examine step-taking behavior at high resolution so that they distinguish many 
variations of step-taking behavior. In either case, a large majority of step-taking behaviors will 
causally contribute to the goal of gaining traction on the ground: due to the stable morphological 
features of an ant’s foot, it gains traction in most instances of step-taking behavior regardless of 
variations in angle or velocity of impact. Thus, though the behavior type’s goal is reliably 
achieved, it is not difficult. Accordingly, researchers do not posit content-carrying functions as 
somehow mediating the metatarsal’s ability to gain traction. 
 Now consider Wittlinger et al.’s ascription of content to step-counting type processes. As 
they hypothesize, the step-counter is some neurophysiological mechanism that has the goal-
directed function of assuming different states corresponding to different distances travelled by 
the ant. So, the step-counter must have the capacity to record at least as many distances as 
foraging ants regularly walk in their searches for food. If the step-counting hypothesis is true, 
then those distances are likely individuated according to some unit of locomotion, like a step. 
Furthermore, for any particular instance of navigation, the goal of the step-counter is tightly 
specified: it must assume the state corresponding to the units of locomotion actually travelled by 
the navigating ant. Thus, in any instance of Cataglyphis navigation, the step-counter has a 
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difficult goal-directed function. There are many states the step-counter can assume that reflect 
the many distances ants can walk, but there will always be just a small number of states that 
accurately reflect the distance the ant has actually travelled for the purposes of returning to the 
nest.  
 This notion of difficulty applies just as well to higher-level ascriptions of content made 
by Wehner’s Cataglyphis research program. Just like the step-counter, the path integrator is 
hypothesized to be some neurophysiological process that assumes different states corresponding 
to the distance and direction of the ant relative to her nest. In their meandering foraging journeys, 
ants can find themselves in many different locations relative to their nest, so the path integrator 
must be able to assume a large number of potential states. However, for any instance of actual 
navigation, the ant will find herself in a particular location that a properly functioning path 
integrator must accurately represent by assuming the proper state. Thus, the path integrator has a 
difficult goal. Accordingly, researchers define the path integrator in terms of content-carrying 
functions.  
 
5.2 Reliably Achieved Goals and Naturally-Occurring Contexts 
 Before moving on to the productive role content ascriptions play in Wehner’s 
Cataglyphis research program, the relevant notion of reliability also needs to be clarified. The 
reliability with which an ant achieves a goal-directed function varies with the proportion of 
instances in which the ant performs goal-directed behavior that causally contributes to achieving 
that function. A process that rarely achieves a difficult goal may depend on luck more than 
sophisticated systems of coordination, but a process that reliably achieves a difficult goal 
provides grounds for positing content carrying properties. Hence just as the norms governing 
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appropriate ascriptions of content are sensitive to the difficulty of a goal-directed function, so too 
are they sensitive to how reliably a goal-directed function is achieved. The more difficult the 
goal and the more reliably it is achieved despite that difficulty, the more justified ascriptions of 
content are to the processes that causally contribute to that goal.  
 Of course, both the difficulty of a goal-directed function and the reliability with which an 
animal achieves that function is affected by the context in which the function is attempted. 
Furthermore, as noted in Neander’s critique of Kitcher’s hybrid account of function, the 
adaptiveness of a trait’s outcome is also relative to environmental context. The evidential norms 
governing researcher’s ascriptions of content-baring functions are also sensitive to context. Just 
as ethologists generally treat animals as possessing behavioral repertoires, ethologists also treat 
animals as having naturally-occurring environments and physiologies, and ascriptions of content-
bearing function are justified in relation those naturally-occurring environments and 
physiologies. Indeed, one of the interests that has historically distinguished ethology from other 
fields of animal behavior research is ethologists’ emphasis on understanding animal behavior in 
the animal’s naturally-occurring context. In Wehner’s Cataglyphis research program, the 
difficulty and reliability of a goal-directed function are appropriately assessed within the context 
of naturally-occurring circumstances.3  
 Briefly, I need to address a potential source of confusion concerning the naturally-
occurring contexts just discussed and the experimental circumstances implemented in the stilts 
and stumps experiment. In the stilts and stumps experiment, ants are induced to perform 
																																																						
3	Again, as with researchers’ individuation of trait types, researchers seem to lack an explicit, 
comprehensive account of how they individuate naturally-occurring contexts. Still, it is clear that 
researchers recognize the distinction between naturally-occurring and non-naturally occurring 
circumstances.	
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navigation behavior under manipulated circumstances that do not constitute a naturally-occurring 
context for Cataglyphis. Foragers’ legs do not grow or shrink over the course of a single foraging 
run under naturally-occurring circumstances. Still, researchers use the evidence produced by the 
sticks and stumps experiment to make inferences about the functioning of non-manipulated 
foragers in naturally-occurring contexts. Indeed, researchers take great pains to ensure that their 
experimental manipulations do not create confounding variables (See Wittlinger et al. 2007 for 
an examination of how the stilts and stumps manipulations affected other parameters of forager 
locomotion). By making precise interventions, researchers produce evidence for goal-directed 
functions that apply not just to the animals experimented on, but to Cataglyphis foragers 
generally. Thus, although the range of circumstances implemented in experiments differs from 
the range of circumstances relevant to justified ascriptions of content, the two are epistemically 
connected since evidence produced within experimental circumstances also supports ascriptions 
of goal-directed function within naturally-occurring contexts.   
 
5.3 Difficulty and Reliability Come in Degrees 
 Finally, it is important to note that difficulty and reliability come in degrees. The upshot 
for researchers’ attributions of semantic content is that the appropriateness of those ascriptions 
also come in degrees. The more difficult a function is and the more reliably an animal achieves 
that function, the more appropriate an attribution of semantic content is. Researchers’ 
investigations into the neurosensory physiology underlying Cataglyphis navigation do not result 
in unequivocal determinations of processes that deal in semantic content and processes that do 
not. Rather, their investigations result in gradations of evidence for or against a given process’s 
dealing in semantic content.  
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 For a borderline case, consider how this account handles another component goal 
necessary for the function of successful locomotion. In addition to gaining traction with the 
ground, ants must also time their steps properly to move in a particular direction. Due to the 
technical notion of difficulty developed in this account, whether or not researchers are justified 
in ascribing content to whatever neurophysiological process is responsible for controlling step 
timing depends on both how researchers specify the goal of step timing and how many walking 
rhythms researchers treat ants as possessing in their step timing repertoires. Highly specific goals 
and large repertoires make for difficult functions while more general goals and smaller 
repertoires make for less difficult functions. If researchers take the goal of step timing to be that 
steps are timed so that the ant never stumbles and its body never contacts the ground, then it 
seems that the neurophysiological mechanism controlling step timing has a difficult function. 
Alternatively, if researchers treat the goal of step timing behavior to be timing steps in such a 
way that the ant moves forward, then the goal becomes more general and the function becomes 
less difficult.  
 
6. How Ascriptions of Semantic Content Help Researchers Achieve Their Epistemic 
Aims 
 This section steps back from the details of researchers’ evidential norms and 
experimental practices to consider the larger picture of how their ascriptions of content figure 
into the diachronic progression of their research program. First, I argue that ascriptions of 
content contribute to researchers’ aim of producing mechanistic explanations by guiding the 
mechanistic research strategies of localization and decomposition. Then, I argue that ascriptions 
of content also help researchers achieve their epistemic aim of cross-taxa comparative theorizing.   
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The role I articulate for ascriptions of content here is inferential. Justified ascriptions of 
content serve as warrants for inferences—inferences that go on to guide hypotheses about how 
neurophysiological mechanisms causally interact to generate and control navigation behavior. 
Given my characterization of the evidential norms governing appropriate ascriptions of content, 
they promote an increasingly specific two-step between content and content vehicles that 
produces increasingly detailed accounts of the neurophysiological phenomena responsible for 
ants’ ability to reliably achieve difficult functions.  
Wehner’s (2020, 146) research program is largely engaged in what he has called classical 
neuroethology. In classical neuroethology, one begins with a behavioral trait and then endeavors 
to explain how the behavioral trait is causally generated and controlled by its underlying 
neurophysiological mechanisms. To do that, they engage in the mechanistic research strategies of 
decomposition and localization articulated by Bechtel and Richardson (1992/2010).  
 It all begins with a hypothetical ascription of content that decomposes a behavioral trait 
into physiological mechanisms (e.g. Ants navigate home via the most direct route by means of a 
mechanism that integrates content about distance and direction of travel.) The evidential norms 
governing researchers’ ascriptions of content mean that when researchers decompose a 
behavioral trait with hypothetical ascriptions of content, they formulate hypotheses that would 
account for the reliability with which the behavior achieves its difficult function (e.g. navigating 
home via the most direct route). This initial, hypothetical ascription of content says little about 
content vehicles. It remains an open question what sort of neurophysiological entities within the 
ant carry content about distance and direction of travel. Crucially, however, this specification of 
content constrains and guides hypothesizing about content vehicles. Researchers must ask 
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themselves what phenomena Cataglyphis could potentially exploit that would serve as a reliable 
proxy for distance traveled.  
 Prior to the stilts and stumps experiment, researchers hypothesized that insects record 
distance traveled by monitoring the energy they consume for locomotion (Heran and Wanke 
1952). They also hypothesized that ants record distance traveled via an optic flow mechanism 
that records the rate at which objects move across their visual field (Ronacher et al. 2000). 
Eventually, Wittlinger et al.’s (2006, 2007) stilts and stumps experiment provided decisive 
evidence that ants record distance traveled via some mechanism related to locomotion, like a 
step-counter.  
 That further specification of content vehicles then reciprocally informs hypothesizing 
about content. Once researchers know that the vehicles carrying content about distance travelled 
are related to locomotion, they can formulate more specific hypotheses about the content in 
question. Instead of carrying content about “distance travelled”, the ants are now hypothesized to 
be recording content about “Some parameter associated with rhythmic leg movement in 
walking” (Wittlinger et al. 2007). That specification of content then guides hypotheses further 
specifying content vehicles (e.g. mechanoreceptor hair plates at the base of the legs or 
proprioceptors in leg muscles (Wehner 2020, 154)), and so on.  
 Researchers’ goal-directed style of justifying content ascriptions also helps them transfer 
hypotheses and experimental designs across taxa. After examining the role mental content 
ascriptions play in cognitive ethology, Allen (1992, 8) concluded that “Content-bearing terms, 
which allow functional descriptions of cognitive abilities, permit generalizations across species 
which implement them differently, and, as mentioned above, species comparison is one of the 
basic aims of ethology.” This point nicely fits the present case study. Wehner’s Cataglyphis 
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research program belongs to a tradition of ethological research that has focused on ants and 
honeybees and shares this epistemic aim of producing knowledge via comparisons across taxa. In 
Wehner’s research program, hypothetical ascriptions of content in one taxonomic family are 
sometimes imported to the other, and because both ants and honeybees are central place foragers, 
the goal-directed experiments designed to test those hypotheses can also be transferred.  
 To see this, consider the way investigations into the celestial compass of Cataglyphis and 
honeybees have advanced in tandem. Karl von Frisch (1949) was the first to demonstrate that 
honeybees record content about direction of travel by monitoring patterns of polarized UV 
sunlight in the sky. Later, Wehner and Duelli (1973) established that Cataglyphis can do the 
same by transferring this content-ascribing hypothesis to Cataglyphis and testing it via similar 
experiments. Then, one of Wehner’s doctoral students, Paul Herrling (1976), discovered 
specialized sensory cells along the dorsal rim of Cataglyphis’ eye that seemed morphologically 
suited to detecting patterns of polarized UV light. This constituted a further specification of 
content vehicles involved in recording direction of travel by localizing a pattern sensing 
mechanism to the dorsal rim of Cataglyphis’ eyes. Wehner and colleagues (1975) subsequently 
transferred that hypothesis to honeybees, where they also found specialized sensory cells along 
the dorsal rim of honeybee eyes. Behavioral experiments indicated the shared feature was 
necessary and sufficient for detecting polarized light in Cataglyphis and honeybees (Wehner 
1997; Rossel and Wehner 1984a, 1984b; Wehner and Müller 2006).  
 
7. Conclusion 
 The practice of ascribing internal, content-carrying states to animals has been a perennial 
source of debate in behavioral research. In this paper, I clarified the evidential norms governing 
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ascriptions of content within a successful, well-established neuroethological research program. 
Then, I examined the historical trajectory of that research program to determine whether and 
how such attributions help researchers achieve their epistemic aims. The result has been a 
longitudinal analysis of content ascriptions that begins with experiments designed to justify 
hypothetical ascriptions of content and ends with the way justified ascriptions influence future 
investigations. The account of content attribution resulting from this analysis provides a definite 
means of assessing researchers’ ascriptions of content while respecting the inferential reasoning 
of researchers.  
 Scientists and philosophers lack a comprehensive theory of what it takes in principle for 
something to be a genuine instance of content. For some, the absence of such a theory indicates a 
state of disarray that makes researchers’ ascriptions of content suspect. This paper should 
alleviate such suspicions by demonstrating that the evidential norms governing appropriate 
ascriptions of content can secure a productive role for content ascriptions even though those 
evidential norms do not add up to a comprehensive theory of content. To see how the goal-
directed style of justifying content ascriptions articulated in this paper figures into the broader 
context of behavioral research, philosophers will have to examine the actions and habits of 
reasoning that precede and follow the justification of content ascriptions in other areas of the 
behavioral sciences.   
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